
Gayanga Co. was a Detroit-headquartered, Black-owned heavy civil and demolition contractor built to create real careers for the people in the neighborhoods we rebuilt. From 2016 to 2026 we grew a 32-home contract into the largest Black-owned heavy civil and demolition firm in Michigan — more than $80 million of work, every dollar competitively bid. This is the record of what we built, who we built it with, and what happened at the end.

Gayanga takes its name from Gaspar Yanga, who led escaped enslaved Africans in colonial Mexico and founded the first free colony of Africans in North America — a community built on liberty and self-determination.
Too many "Black-owned" construction companies are Black in name only.
A Black name on the truck, a Black founder at the press conference — and a company that is white where it counts: who owns the equipment, who runs the crews, who keeps the profit.
Gayanga was named so it could never be that.
Black ownership that owned the work: its own crews, its own iron, its own estimators, its own decisions. It was about who did the work, who got paid a living wage for it, and who could say they built something in their own city.
Gayanga Co. was a place where people built their dreams. Our focus was on people. We weren't solely creating jobs — we were creating opportunities.Brian McKinney Sr., Founder & CEO
Detroit was running the largest residential demolition program in the country. Very few of the firms doing the work were owned by Detroiters, and very few of the crews came from the neighborhoods being cleared. The Free Press documented it in 2018: in a majority-Black city, the demolition money was going overwhelmingly to large firms from outside it.
Brian McKinney, a native Detroiter, founded Gayanga Co. in 2016 as a certified minority-owned construction engineering firm headquartered in the city. The idea was simple: if Detroit was going to be rebuilt, Detroiters should be hired, trained, and paid to do it.
It was not easy to get in. Detroit required its own demolition license, the review board was made up largely of the contractors a newcomer would bid against, and a Black-owned company with no track record had to be bonded before it could bid a single group of houses.

32 homes in late 2017, 186 in 2018, more than 400 a year by 2019. City work grew from a $500,000 first contract to $17 million in 2021; revenue from $450,000 to nearly $18 million; bonding from $3.5 million to $12 million. And the work grew beyond demolition — water mains, earthwork, site development, industrial work for Marathon and DTE, and joint ventures on some of the biggest projects in the city.
Detroit-headquartered, certified minority-owned, licensed by the State and the City.
32 homes under the Hardest Hit Fund, hiring from the neighborhoods where it worked.
When Gayanga said publicly that Hardest Hit Fund money was going overwhelmingly to large non-minority firms, the Land Bank's bidding rules changed in ways that shut it out of the regular bid groups. For nearly two years it lived on emergency demolitions and a water contract it won on its own — more than 700 water disconnects and basement pump-outs for the Detroit Building Authority under a $2.2 million contract, later extended and followed by a $2.25 million Water Related Services contract. Its first underground work; those crews became its water main teams. 186 homes demolished.
Selected directly by BNA Constructors to clear, grub, and grade the 160-acre Gordie Howe International Bridge port-of-entry site. Took the five-story Historic Woodland apartment building down in 10 days. Handled demolition, contaminated-soil removal, and ash-basin backfill at DTE's Conners Creek Power Plant. 400-plus homes demolished. Brian McKinney named to Crain's 40 Under 40.
After Council rejected the Mayor's first blight bond, Gayanga's leadership and a coalition of Black contractors stood with Council members to push a rewritten proposal built around Detroit jobs and Detroit businesses. Voters approved Proposal N that November — $250 million, a 30 percent set-aside for Detroit small businesses, and a 51 percent Detroit-resident hiring target — and Mayor Duggan publicly credited Gayanga's CEO for helping get it passed. Gayanga then worked with Council and Locals 324 and 1191 on the equalization-credit amendments that gave Detroit-based union contractors a fair shot, and formed its first joint ventures with Major Cement.
BridgeDetroit's analysis showed Gayanga holding six Proposal N contracts worth about $18.45 million — the most of any contractor. Marathon Petroleum hired Gayanga as prime demolition contractor for its Boynton neighborhood program. The Major joint venture added the West Warren and East Warren streetscapes; a three-year DWSD water contract followed; the Workforce Development Program graduated its first cohort.
The back office came of age: the City's Deputy CFO came over as CFO, the compliance specialist was hired out of the City's own demolition compliance department, and a safety and environmental manager recruited from Independence Excavating had authority over every site. 70 employees on payroll.
78 employees, $3.3 million in payroll, and a network of Detroit-based subcontractors. Henry Ford Health selected Gayanga as a minority partner on its Destination: Grand campus expansion.
Gayanga and Major Contracting were awarded roughly $43 million of DWSD water main work for 2025–2027. Gayanga entered 2025 with more than $40 million of contracted work on the books.
By 2025 Gayanga was a heavy civil contractor — water mains, underground utilities, streetscapes, earthwork, site development — often as the Detroit-based, Black-owned partner that let a larger firm meet the City's inclusion goals with a company that actually self-performed the work. The longest partnership was with Major Contracting, which Gayanga first hauled for in 2017. From 2020 the two bid the City's streetscape program through City-certified joint ventures — McNichols (PW-7004), Conant (PW-7016), Grand River and Puritan (PW-7017), Rosa Parks (PW-7015), West Warren (PW-7013), East Warren (PW-7034) — about $25 million of Public Works work, then DWSD water mains, and in 2025 a standing company, Gayanga Major Joint Venture LLC.
Most contractors Gayanga's size bought their estimating from outside. Gayanga built it in. LaCresha Turner — an African American civil engineer, Detroit Public Schools graduate, and 25-year construction veteran — joined after the first award as Vice President of Engineering & Estimating and built the department that took the company from house-by-house bids to water main packages, streetscapes, and industrial work, training a bench of engineering interns along the way. When Gayanga had under $1 million in awards, that department did not exist; by 2022 it was pricing $25 million of work a year.
In 2019 Independence Excavating brought Gayanga on for DTE's Conners Creek Power Plant demolition — 20,000 cubic yards of contaminated soil, the ash basin backfilled, the Edison Boat Club demolished, 3,500 crew hours on a live industrial site. It put a Black-owned Detroit contractor on a power plant demolition of that scale, doing the heavy work. Independence's project manager closed the job with a note: "A great project, with great team members." In 2022 Marathon Petroleum, after its own safety prequalification, hired Gayanga directly for the Boynton neighborhood program beside the refinery and kept issuing work orders through 2025.

The partnership was awarded two DWSD water main replacement contracts, WS-744 and WS-745, running through 2027 — Gayanga's own crews in the trench and its trucks on the hauling.

Selected as a minority partner on the multibillion-dollar Henry Ford Health expansion in New Center — utilities, excavation, and concrete work on one of the largest health-care builds in Michigan.

Site clearing, grubbing, grading, erosion control, sediment ponds, and berm construction for what became one of the largest ports of entry in North America.
Approximately 2,500 structures demolished and more than $80 million in contracts across demolition, water, utilities, streetscapes, site work, and joint ventures — every City contract won through a competitive bid.

A five-story, 44-unit apartment building taken down with a high-reach excavator in 10 days on a contract that allowed 120. Dust suppression and air monitoring throughout; the City's appeals board reviewed the job and cleared Gayanga.

Demolition, abatement management, backfill, grading, and hauling in every district of the city — from the Hardest Hit Fund through Proposal N.

Excavation, hauling, and Class II landfill disposal of 20,000 cubic yards of contaminated soil, ash-basin backfill, and demolition of the Edison Boat Club.

Abatement, demolition, and backfill of refinery-purchased homes, performed directly for Marathon under its own safety program — nine job packages by 2025.
Nine years of Detroiters doing the work — from the first two excavators to power plants, water mains, and the people who ran them.















A Black-owned contractor doing the most work in the program knew it would be watched more closely than anyone. So Gayanga built a compliance operation no other contractor its size carried — and paid for it out of its own margins.
It hired the people who already knew the City's rules and paid them to enforce those rules inside the company — every one recruited from the City, the Land Bank, or the region's largest union demolition firms.
It worked: from 2016 until the September 2025 suspension, every complaint raised against Gayanga was examined and found unsubstantiated. The most thorough test was the City of Detroit Office of Inspector General's own 2023 investigation, over an allegation about one individual's handling of load tickets. Gayanga turned over every ticket and source approval; the OIG interviewed the field and office staff one at a time, with no company leadership in the room; and on September 27, 2023, it closed the case with no evidence to substantiate the allegations. That is what a real investigation looks like. Two years later, on the same subject, the same office did none of it before publishing.
Every time someone came for Gayanga's name, the record was checked. Every time, it held.
A local media personality claimed Gayanga had released asbestos into a neighborhood at 31 Woodland.
Dust suppression ran throughout and an environmental firm monitored the air. On September 17, 2019, the City's demolition appeals board reviewed the data and cleared Gayanga.
An allegation about one individual's handling of backfill load tickets — a claim about a person, not the company.
Every ticket and source approval produced; field and office staff interviewed one at a time. Case closed September 27, 2023: no evidence to substantiate the allegations.
The OIG announced Gayanga had filled its sites with contaminated dirt from a Northland Mall redevelopment.
The Mayor's own review found otherwise. "We reported to the Inspector General that the idea that in the first half of 2024 large amounts of dirt came from other locations did not appear to be true." — Mayor Mike Duggan, December 22, 2025. Watch the briefing.
Every demolition group in Detroit's program — Hardest Hit Fund, General Fund, Proposal N — was a sealed, competitive bid run by the City's procurement office. The lowest responsive bidder won. Gayanga bid on nearly all of them, lost far more than it won, and won its share. And under the City charter, Council does not select contractors; the Mayor's administration makes the awards and Council votes only to approve them. A Council member cannot hand anyone a contract.
The City's terms were the same for everyone: if "the lowest bidder does not receive final contract approval, the City of Detroit reserves the right to award to the next lowest bidder." Prices, not relationships, decided the work.
June 2023: the City released Proposal N Groups Q7, Q8, Q9, and Q10 together. Gayanga bid all four and won one — Q10. The other three went to lower bidders.
Summer 2024: of eighteen emergency demolition bids the City opened, Gayanga won three. Other Detroit contractors won six, seven, and three.
Every contract went to City Council in public session with the bid tabulation attached — roughly $59 million of Gayanga awards between 2019 and 2022 alone, according to the Free Press.
Detroit's ordinance gave certified Detroit-headquartered businesses a small bid equalization credit to offset the cost of hiring residents and paying union scale. Gayanga earned it by actually being headquartered here, employing Detroiters, and paying prevailing wages — all verified by the City.
Proposal N added a 30 percent set-aside for Detroit small businesses and a 51 percent resident hiring requirement. Gayanga competed in that program alongside more than twenty other contractors.
Gayanga pushed the City to enforce its own prequalification rules when firms with no employees beat qualified contractors, hired workers who had been paid in cash by non-union firms and put them on union payroll, and brought smaller Black contractors on as subcontractors, truckers, and abatement crews when it won.
No contractor in the demolition program created more living-wage jobs for Black and brown residents in the city of Detroit.Gayanga statement, October 2025
Giving back was not a program. It was the point.
1,000 mealsWith the City's Parks & Recreation Department and FEED Detroit, Thanksgiving meals at four recreation centers — Adams Butzel, Farwell, Kemeny, and Joseph Walker Williams — and more packed and delivered the next day.
In the roomCareer fairs, high schools, recreation centers, the CDL class at Wayne County Community College, hiring days at the Northwest Activities Center, 1,500 freshmen from 22 Detroit high schools at Find Your Future, 750 more at United Way's Summer Career Connections Fair. Gayanga showed up, told people the jobs existed, and made sure the people telling them looked like them. When Brian McKinney saw women in that CDL class, he brought Whitney in to tell them one of Gayanga's best drivers was a woman.
Side by sideWhen the City needed a contractor at a community meeting, a press conference, or a career fair, Gayanga went. When Gayanga celebrated, the City came: at the fifth-anniversary dinner, Conrad Mallett — then Deputy Mayor, now the City's Corporation Counsel — joined the toast.
For nearly a decade, the public record on Gayanga was a record of a company doing what it said it would do.
On September 11, 2025, the City of Detroit Office of Inspector General — the City's own OIG, not a state or federal office — publicly suspended Gayanga and its founder over backfill dirt, without first contacting the supplier it accused us of misrepresenting. The suspension expired March 11, 2026, at the 180-day limit, with no findings. By then the City had canceled every one of Gayanga's contracts, and a company built over a decade was gone. Everything below comes from public statements, public meetings, and Gayanga's complaint in Wayne County Circuit Court.
A prior inquiry by the City's OIG, under Inspector General Ellen Ha, was not substantiated. Gayanga was cleared and moved all backfill to the City's public sources on its own initiative.
The City raised Gayanga's pace from 10–12 to 16–18 demolitions a week — on July 24, 2024, the Mayor's office wrote that "Mayor Duggan has asked to meet with you … to discuss demolition production," and the meeting was held in his office. Gayanga had a free, City-approved source of its own at Far West / Rouge Park. It moved to the City's public source list anyway, believing that after 2023 the public list gave it more protection. It bought where the City told every contractor to buy. Every load was documented; the City's own liaisons inspected the sites.
The Construction & Demolition Department pulled Gayanga sites at random and audited the tickets and compliance forms. Its one question was a truck number typed "19" instead of "198." Eight months later the same department's testing would be the basis for a public suspension.
Following the City's source list, Gayanga used Iron Horse of Michigan — approved by the City in 2023 and the kind of native pit the Mayor called "the gold standard for backfill" — at dozens of properties. SC Environmental, Adamo, and Salenbien used the same source at hundreds more.
The OIG suspended Gayanga and Brian McKinney, alleging the dirt came from a Northland Mall redevelopment and that "33 of 41" tested sites failed. Before publishing it had contacted one supplier — Ashley, which confirmed Gayanga's loads. It had not contacted Iron Horse, the source it accused Gayanga of misrepresenting; Major Contracting, which hauled most of the material; or any carrier. It had not interviewed Gayanga. It has never told Gayanga who made the allegations or what they were based on.
After Gayanga named its supplier publicly, the City tested other contractors' sites, found the same contamination, and suspended Iron Horse.
The City's Inspector General told Council Gayanga had "filled roughly 2,400 residential sites." Gayanga's field work stopped. Payroll for dozens of Detroiters stopped with it.
In his last week in office, Mayor Duggan disclosed that the OIG's tip — that Gayanga had filled "all of their holes" with Northland Mall material — had been checked with the supplier, which confirmed 309 of 323 sites. "The report was inaccurate," he said. Iron Horse had supplied four contractors at 424 sites, only 87 of them Gayanga's, and the City had "no evidence to believe that the contractors knew."
The suspension lapsed at the 180-day limit in the City's ordinance. No investigation — by the OIG, the police, or anyone — has found wrongdoing by Brian McKinney or anyone at Gayanga. But the City had canceled roughly $34 million of Proposal N contracts and Gayanga's share of the $43 million DWSD joint venture. There was nothing left to return to.
Gayanga closed its doors and filed a $100 million defamation lawsuit against the City of Detroit Office of Inspector General in Wayne County Circuit Court (Case No. 26-007722-CZ), so the full record could be examined in open court.
The City's response was a motion to dismiss on governmental immunity — an argument that its Inspector General cannot be sued for what it said, not that what it said was true. Gayanga filed its opposition on August 7, 2026. The motion is pending.
The theory is that Gayanga bought cheap contaminated fill to save money. The record shows the opposite. Through its joint-venture partner's DWSD project at Far West Detroit / Rouge Park, 21800 West Warren — a City-owned site approved as a public source on resubmission by the City's Group Executive for Construction and Demolition — Gayanga had clean backfill at no cost, trucked to its sites at no cost. There was no financial reason to put anything else in a hole.
And Gayanga went looking for more clean dirt the hard way: from November 2024 to April 2025 it paid four laboratories and consultants to retest Waste Management's Woodland Meadows site — 900,000 tons of native soil — to get it approved for the whole program. A contractor trying to sneak bad dirt into Detroit does not spend six months and its own money trying to get good dirt approved.
It is alleged Gayanga used contaminated dirt from a Northland Mall redevelopment in Southfield, Michigan to backfill residential properties in the City of Detroit.
Test results showed that the dirt located at 33 of the 41 (over 80%) properties tested thus far failed to meet the state's residential standards.
The expiration of the interim suspension is strictly the result of time limits imposed by the Debarment Ordinance and should not be interpreted as a finding or indication that Gayanga Co., LLC or Mr. McKinney has been cleared of wrongdoing.
The first report we got was from the Office of the Inspector General, who said that they had a tip that in the first six months of 2024, Gayanga wasn't actually using approved sources. They were filling all of their holes with contamination from the Northland Mall. Now the tickets showed that the dirt came from Ashley, a native sand and gravel pit … We went out to Ashley and said to Ashley, did they get the dirt from you? And Ashley said in 309 of the 323 cases, they did get the dirt from us. And so, the report was inaccurate.
We reported to the Inspector General that the idea that in the first half of 2024 large amounts of dirt came from other locations did not appear to be true.
"We reported to the Inspector General that the idea that in the first half of 2024 large amounts of dirt came from other locations did not appear to be true."
It is what the same office did in 2023, and what Gayanga's court filings lay out step by step.
| An investigator normally | The City of Detroit Inspector General, 2025 |
|---|---|
| Interviews the accused before accusing them. | Never interviewed Gayanga's leadership or the crews who ran the backfill before publishing. Its own office had done exactly that in 2023. |
| Verifies the tip against the sources named on the records. | Checked one source — Ashley, which confirmed 309 of 323 — then stopped. Never called Iron Horse, the joint-venture partner that hauled most of the material, or a single carrier. |
| Counts everything it knows. | Announced 41 sites. Left out the 323 the City had already checked — and put four of those already-checked sites on the "failed" list. |
| Corrects the record when the facts change. | After the Mayor said on December 22, 2025 that the theory "did not appear to be true," the OIG repeated "33 of 41 (over 80%)" on March 19, 2026, without updating a number. |
| Treats everyone in the same position the same way. | Four contractors used the same City-approved source with the same results. One was named, suspended, and stripped of its contracts. |
| Refers to the police after it investigates — not instead of investigating. | The suspension came September 11. By the Mayor's account the police were brought in September 17, and the OIG's own investigation was still "ongoing" six months later. |
The OIG's "33 of 41" was the whole public case. The list of those 33 is attached to Gayanga's complaint. It breaks down like this.
were backfilled in 2025 with Iron Horse material — the City-approved source three other contractors were using at hundreds of sites, and that the City itself later suspended.
were on Tacoma Street, backfilled in 2022 and 2023, mostly from Far West Detroit — a City-owned site the City's own consultant approved.
were backfilled in the first half of 2024 from the Ashley pit — the exact period the City had already checked and reported to the OIG "did not appear to be true." They are on the OIG's own list: 3946 Lemay (January 5, 2024), 3526 Beatrice (February 12), 4563 Belvidere (April 4), and 6760 Brimson (June 4).
was backfilled in 2018, six years before the tip, under a different program.
The arithmetic, using only the City's numbers: before the suspension the City checked 323 first-half-2024 sites with the supplier — 309 confirmed, 12 elevated, 2 clean, so 311 clean. The OIG had that information, announced the 41, and left out the 323. Together, counting the four properties on both lists once, 360 sites had been checked. The OIG's 33 against 360 is about 9 percent, not 80. Even adding the eight other elevated sites the City found, it is 41 of 360 — about 11 percent. Roughly nine of ten sites were clean.
Why did the announcement leave out the 309 sites the City had already confirmed?
Gayanga's answer, in its complaint, is that the OIG was looking for a contractor to blame, not for the truth. It never interviewed Gayanga's leadership or crews. It never called the supplier it accused Gayanga of misrepresenting. It relied on the City's Construction & Demolition Department to do the testing — the department that had approved every source. It referred the matter to the police six days after the suspension, not before. And none of the other three contractors using the same source had their staff questioned, their tickets pulled, or their contracts touched.
Every source in question — Far West Detroit, Ashley, Iron Horse — was approved by the City's Construction & Demolition Department and its consultant. That department set the pace, ran the liaisons, published the source list, and then conducted the testing the OIG relied on. A finding that the approved sources were bad is a finding about the department that approved them. A finding that one contractor cheated is not. Gayanga believes the second story was told because the first one could not be — and notes that the official who, as a deputy director of the Building Authority, oversaw the 2018 rule changes that pushed Gayanga out went on to run the department that approved these sources.
That reform is an admission of what was wrong before. Gayanga is asking who was responsible for it.
Gayanga does not say this with bitterness. It says it because the public record says it, and because the people who lost their jobs deserve to know why.
Iron Horse of Michigan's pit in Milford was approved as a public source by the City's consultant on August 3, 2023, and was on the list the Construction & Demolition Department sent every contractor in 2024. What the City did not say is that Iron Horse's owner, Rodney Burrell, had pleaded guilty in 2010, in the federal case that ended the Kilpatrick administration, to submitting an inflated bid to help a Kilpatrick associate win a City contract — as BridgeDetroit reported after the suspension. Gayanga used it at dozens of properties in 2025 — 87 by the City's count. SC Environmental, Adamo, and Salenbien used it at hundreds more.
On March 9, 2026, a City official told Council that a contaminated site at 5558 Ivanhoe was "the Gayanga dirty-dirt property." State records list SC Environmental as the contractor, and the City had already paid $37,298.40 to remediate it. The program's most expensive cleanup, nearly $93,000 at 4551 25th Street, was SC Environmental's too.
We used the same City-approved sources on the City's own list, yet we alone were accused — and only after we identified our supplier and handed over the records did the City test other sites and find the same contamination elsewhere. Had the Inspector General investigated before making public accusations, this source would have been stopped sooner and far fewer holes filled with dirt that could have been contaminated.Gayanga Co. statement to the Detroit Free Press, June 25, 2026
While the Law Department told Council that cost recovery "is being pursued" — against Gayanga — the City hired the contractor whose own sites had failed to do the cleanup, then, as the complaint states, had it perform "the majority of backfill replacement work on Gayanga's sites." The table below has the addresses and purchase orders.
By July 2026 the City had excavated more than 100 sites at roughly $35,000 each, with 450 to go and a total approaching $27 million — triple the Mayor's December forecast. Gayanga was the one contractor not working.
Addresses, purchase orders, and amounts — checkable against the City's procurement records and the State's EGLE notifications.
| Address | Demolished and backfilled by | City paid to remediate | Paid to | City PO |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| 3314 Edsel | SC Environmental | $32,795.16 | SC Environmental — to replace its own backfill | 3093665 (bid 186735) |
| 1230 Patricia | SC Environmental | $32,286.76 | SC Environmental — to replace its own backfill | 3094572 |
| 8392 Gartner | SC Environmental | $33,203.35 | SC Environmental — to replace its own backfill | 3095392 |
| 8087 Vanderbilt | SC Environmental | $44,756.40 | SC Environmental — to replace its own backfill | 3093487 |
| 5558 Ivanhoe | SC Environmental | $37,298.40 | Another contractor | 3091332 |
| 1330 Wheelock | SC Environmental | $36,514.80 | Another contractor | 3090851 |
| 6096 Chopin | SC Environmental | $31,204.80 | Another contractor | 3090726 |
| 11736 Mendota | SC Environmental | $36,930.00 | Another contractor | 3090720 |
| 4551 25th Street | SC Environmental | $92,880.00 — the most expensive cleanup in the program | Another contractor | 3093166 |
| 8982 McClellan | — (the wrong address; the contaminated property was 8990 McClellan) | $27,280.64 | SC Environmental — for a property that never needed the work | — |
Every address in the first nine rows was SC Environmental's, not Gayanga's. The City paid SC Environmental $143,041.67 to redo its own work at four of them and other contractors $234,828 to fix five more — $377,869.67 for one contractor never publicly named. The last row is the City's admitted mistake: it fenced "the wrong address," paid SC Environmental $27,280.64 to dig out 8982 McClellan, and left the contaminated house next door, 8990 McClellan, to "be rebid." The requestor of record was the department's director.
Gayanga never asked for special treatment — only the treatment the City gave everyone else in the same program.
In 2019 two former Adamo Group employees pleaded guilty in federal court to bribery and bid-rigging in Detroit's demolition program. Adamo was not suspended, its contracts were not canceled, and it was still working in the program, using the same Iron Horse source, in 2025.
Gayanga: no employee charged, no finding of wrongdoing, company and founder suspended by name, every contract canceled.
In June 2022 the OIG suspended Inner City Contracting, a Detroit demolition contractor with nearly $10 million in program contracts. In September it rescinded the suspension. Its contracts had waited for it.
In November 2025 the OIG told Council an interim suspension means "all contracts are canceled." That is what happened to Gayanga — and not what happened to Inner City three years earlier.
The Mayor promised to "go after" those responsible. Instead the City paid SC Environmental $143,041.67 to replace its own backfill, $27,280.64 more to remediate the wrong address, and then hired it to replace the backfill on Gayanga's sites. Adamo and Salenbien kept working. So did Gayanga's joint-venture partner, which hauled most of Gayanga's material — never questioned, never named.
Gayanga, whose sites received the same material from the same City-approved source, was the only one of the four not working — and the only one named.
Announced to the press on September 11, 2025 — eight weeks before the mayoral election, with the founder's name in the headline, before anyone from the company had been asked a question. If the OIG believed individuals had done wrong, it never said who, or what. It suspended the company.
Gayanga believes the timing and the target were not accidents. Readers can draw their own conclusions from the record above.
By the City's count, Iron Horse material went to 424 sites across four contractors. Eighty-seven were Gayanga's. The OIG led with "33 of 41," never corrected it, never mentioned the 309 of 323 its own tip got wrong, and never named the other three — who kept working, and were then paid to clean up. The questions Gayanga has asked the court are simple: why the selective narrative, and who it was meant to protect.
Gayanga was built to create real opportunity for Black Detroiters in an industry where access has historically been limited. For nearly a decade we opened doors, built careers, and proved a Black-owned firm can compete and lead at the highest level. We bid for our work, competed fairly, and fought for smaller Black contractors. When Gayanga closed, no one filled the void. The union-scale jobs did not move to another company. They simply went away.
This is not only about one company. It sends a chilling message to the next generation of Black contractors and workers, and it left the smaller contractors, truckers, and partners who depended on this work dealing with the fallout. That is why we filed suit: so the truth can be told — for Gayanga, and for every community-based business striving for a fair shot in Detroit.
This chapter closed painfully. We remain proud of what Gayanga stood for, proud of the opportunities we created, and confident the truth will be told.
